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0. An aesthetic of code
This article is an introduction to and exploration of the concept of ‘soft thought’. What
we want to propose through the definition of this concept is an aesthetic of digital
code that does not necessarily presuppose a relation with the generative aspects of
coding, nor with its sensorial perception and evaluation. Numbers do not have to
produce something, and do not need to be transduced into colours and sounds, in
order to be considered as aesthetic objects. Starting from this assumption, our main
aim will be to reconnect the numerical aesthetic of code with a more ‘abstract’ kind
of feeling, the feeling of numbers indirectly felt as conceptual contagions’, that are
‘conceptually felt but not directly sensed. The following pages will be dedicated to
the explication and exemplification of this particular mode of feeling, and to its
possible definition as ‘soft thought’.
The debate on the aesthetic of digital code has been predominantly focused, , on the
non-representational and non-functional performativity of coding and its infinite
possible infractions (errors, glitches and noise), emphasising that it is precisely
these infractions that give code its real aesthetic value. An example of this ‘post-
digital’ tendency towards error is the so called ‘aesthetic of failure’ proposed by,
among others, sound designers and media artists such as Kim Cascone and Tony
Scott, and conceptualized by theorists like Tony D. Sampson and Imam Moradi.1
For these critics and practitioners, the accident shows how code can be productive
of an aesthetic effect that results from uncertainty, random indeterminacy, or what
goes against its own logic. The aesthetic of the digital accident indeed implies that
codes are modes of thought, but only to the extent that they concretely do or realize
things, even if in an imperfect or erroneous way. Codes are engines of production,
of government and control, but also of confusion and chaos, as they exist not in
isolation but bearing upon concrete structures (from data structures, to the physical
effects of code on the material structures of reality). Glitch aesthetic in this sense
relies, in order to emerge, on the actual production of a disruptive break in these
very structures and functions of code-control.
It is important to highlight how this performative conception of coding implies that the
code is not a pre-set form of instructions, but is rather continuously produced from
within computational processes. Furthermore, the insistence on productivity, even in
its disruptive and disrupted form, indicates an operative mode of thinking ‘in’ and
‘through’ matter, in the sense of presupposing a corollary of material realizations. In
this sense, novelty in digitality is said to arise from the material operativity of coding,
where coding is intended as a mode of thought deployed through technical
applications and material errors, and where an abstract code is always in need of
being concretely doing something, even simply of dysfunctionally disrupting itself. It
is through this idea of ‘doing by coding’ that glitches or operational errors become
unexpected sources of novelty in the computational process, resulting in a particular
form of code aesthetic. Even when the technology becomes very complex and
sophisticated, the aesthetic (and philosophical) value of the code is merely
considered as lying in the qualitative resonance of its effects, rather than in the
operation of computing per se. Adopting the same ‘qualitative’ approach, a myriad
parallel aesthetic currents in various fields have also been evaluating and reinforcing
the resonance of code in its material effects, for example with architects focusing on
the design of generative algorithms, and on the production of organic qualities and
topological forms of space as their main perceptual effects. With their capacity to
disrupt the ‘cold’ automated linearity of formal languages, these effects encourage
us to perceive a dimension where algorithms have almost managed to ‘come to life’.
Among the many examples existing in this genre, we can arbitrarily mention here the
‘narcissus’ architectural installation in Frankfurt by SOFTlab, or the short digital films
by FIELD.2
Another question often posed to the aesthetic of code, has been that addressing the
sensorial alterations or affects produced by technology on the human body-subject.
According to Mark Hansen, digitalization has an incredible potential to reveal the
physical source and aim of art, by establishing new interactive relations between
structural geometric systems and bodily phenomenology, and by exploring
unthought and unexpected ways to physically perceive, experience, even imagine
time and space.3 From this point of view, the main scope of every digital art
‘application’ becomes to extract or amplify the qualitative, organic sensations
emerging from the aesthetic experience. As an example of this conception, some of
the most recent experiments with Motion Capture in the field of performance art take
the information gathered or captured about human movement as a starting point to
shape the kind and scope of questions normally posed to technology. This sort of
approach (adopted, for instance, by Chris Salter’s interventions in digital
performance art) applies the physical specificity of the body’s experience to the
design of ‘more fluid’ human-computer interaction environments.4 Here, the organic
continuity and fluidity of the performed human movements directs the way in which
technology is designed and experienced, while the technology itself is sensed as
bouncing back and impacting on bodily movement and perception with its own
sensations and affects.
Looking for the glitch in the functionality of the algorithmic system, or waiting for new
qualities and affects to be generated by it, have so far been the two interwoven,
polarizing tendencies of contemporary digital aesthetics. But most of these
experiments and critical debates seem to overlook a fundamental aspect, that is the
autonomy of code, ‘code in itself’, thus discarding all real engagement with its
specific aesthetics. What is left behind here is the very possibility for digital
algorithms to be seen as what they primarily are, i.e. mechanisms for the
processing and calculation of quantities of data, rather than instruments for the
production of qualities/effects. It is mainly to this quantifying capacity that we ascribe
the aesthetic value of software, a value that we want to associate not to sensorial
perception but to something that we define as ‘thought’: a thinking not relatable to
any subjective or conscious reflection but to the automated, abstract dimension of
numbers. The definition of ‘soft thought’ we are proposing here thus indicates
nothing more than that numerical and logical mode of thinking which is proper of
software itself.
We have already briefly described this mode of thought as a feeling or, more
precisely an abstract ‘conceptual feeling’. Following Alfred N. Whitehead’s
vocabulary, a feeling must be intended here as nothing else than a ‘prehension’ or,
in other words, a registering, a capture, the way in which one actual entity enters,
transformed, the world of another. It is important to note the non-anthropomorphic
and non-organic nature of prehensions as the immanent ground of all perceptions
(physical prehensions) and thoughts (conceptual prehensions): the stone prehends
the water it falls into, an addend prehends another in every mathematical addition. In
Whitehead’s philosophical system, feelings (or prehensions) can in fact be
distinguished as ‘physical’ and ‘conceptual’. Whereas a physical feeling involves the
simple capture of what concretely ‘is’ and ‘becomes’ in the world, a conceptual
feeling is a ‘pure mental operation’, the feeling “of what is not and may be, … of
some possibility as to how actualities may be definite.”5 This potential of what ‘may
be’ definite in the actual world is described by Whitehead as an ‘eternal object’, or an
idea. A conceptual feeling is, in this sense, the abstract, non-subjective and non-
conscious, non-corporeal and non-physical, feeling of an idea. If, as argued by
Whitehead, these conceptual feelings bear “no reference to particular actualities, or
to any particular actual world,” the mathematical thinking of non-actualised data
implied by computer software can thus easily be intended as a form of ‘pure’
conceptual feeling. This means that soft thought does not just rely on the
performativity of the act of coding or on its physical application (in the same way in
which, for Whitehead, every conceptual feeling corresponds but differentiates itself
from a physical feeling). Rather, and more importantly, what is at stake is the
algorithmic prehension of numerical data as abstract ideas, as ‘what is not and may
be’, what has not been actualized (yet) but is nevertheless real.
We should at this point reiterate that the definition of soft thought we are adopting
here does not lead to the conception of algorithms as a form of ‘cognition’ whereby
software (or thought) necessarily depends on the physical machines or bodies on
which it runs. According to Andy Clark’s theory of ‘extended functionalism’, digital
algorithms partake of the extended, software-like nature of the mind, where thought
is a syntax that can be programmed and can run on any human or digital object.6 In
this theory, digital machines are considered as mere extensions or functional
activators of the software of the mind, with thought mainly framed into a closed
syntactic form that can be endlessly reconfigured through various organic and
inorganic extensions. From this standpoint, whilst we do share with the ‘extended
mind’ hypothesis the idea that thought is not limited to the biological skin, we reject
the syntax model of thought and the connectionist ontology on which it is grounded.
Why should digital algorithmic processing be just another instance of a universal
and predetermined grammar of thought? And if cognition is like the software of
sequential or parallel connections bearing upon any sort of machine, organic or
inorganic, all intended as extended prostheses of the brain, can there ever be new
modes of thought that can escape this ‘mind’ model? The point here is certainly not
to reject the software model in toto, but to unlock the potentialities of thought beyond
the limits of an enclosed grammar and of the bodily extensions by which this
grammar is operated.
On the other hand, whilst the hypothesis of the ‘extended mind’ relegates thought to
syntax and to the connectionist framework of a partes extra partes extended body,
Varela and Thompson’s theory of ‘embodied cognition’ rejects the assumption that
digital algorithms are cognitive extensions at all.7 Instead, they argue, thought is
always already part of an affective environment of material, physical relations which
primarily constitute and depend on lived experience. This means that thought is an
analogue process defined by relational qualities that cannot be reproduced by binary
codes. In short, cognition is not equivalent to a software program, but instead
emerges out of a situated relation in the concrete world. Whilst seemingly in
opposition, what these two cognitive approaches would possibly agree on is that the
aesthetic of software is not to be found in digital algorithms per se, but in the body,
object, or hardware which sustains software as a mode of thought. In other words,
for both extended functionalism and embodied cognition, digital algorithms could
only ever acquire an aesthetic value (for them corresponding to aesthesis, as
‘sensing’ or ‘perceiving’) if and when they bear upon a material body. Both
approaches assume in fact that a physical body adds feeling to an otherwise
mathematical, non-physical, and consequently non-aesthetic, thought. This
approach overlooks the possibility of engaging with the aesthetic proper of digital
algorithms in code, without conceiving of them as simple representations of an
analog experience. For us, instead, the aesthetic of soft thought precisely implies
that digital algorithms are autonomous, conceptual modes of thinking, a thinking that
is always already a mode of feeling ordered in binary codes, and is not to be
confused with sensing or perceiving. Numerical processing is always a feeling, a
simultaneously physical and conceptual mode of feeling data, physical in the actual
operations of the hardware-software machine, conceptual in the grasp of numbers
as virtualities or potentials.
The aesthetic conception offered in this article will therefore aim at including
numbers and quantities, instructions and programming, or those ideas that
Whitehead would call ‘eternal mathematical objects’, pure potentials for
actualisation.8 In this sense, the main question for us becomes: how can numbers
and quantities be an aesthetic mode of thought, without having to be primarily
transduced into qualities? These numerical data, we will also argue, do not simply
represent a closed, computable and determined world but also constitute a virtual,
incomputable dimension, with digital algorithms becoming the actual hosts of
random incalculable quantities. Instead of claiming that incomputability amounts to a
surplus of information that digital systems cannot contain, we are instead interested
in exploring how this incomputability always infects (and to some extent constitutes)
the order of all data. In other words, the aspect of soft thought that we would like to
investigate here lies in this double articulation of digital processing, whereby the
actual order of the digital system is infected with the virtuality of incomputable
information. A final, important point will thus be to conceptualize such
incomputability as the potentiality or abstractness of all algorithmic code, that which
distinguishes it from its material level and makes it into an aesthetic object in itself.
1. Model and metamodel
R&Sie(n)’s architectural project I’ve heard about it… (A fat, flat, growing urban
experiment) (2005-6) is the computation of a urban space that does not yet exist, a
software experiment drawing upon the dynamics of the auto-regulation of urban
relations.9 Far from just designing the model or prototype of an actual city, this
project is what Felix Guattari would define as a ‘metamodel’: the mathematical
prehension of a urban system that is simply relatable to the order of data structures,
to the abstract dimension of numbers and their autonomous connections and
disconnections, and which is neither driven by a pre-established logic nor by an
external set of concrete influences. I’ve heard about it…, therefore, is the metamodel
of a city whose data architectures do not model an existing urban space but simply
construct its order. The project, in other words, has no references to predetermined
ideas or to the concreteness of reality, but simply describes the conceptual
prehension of an ‘architecture of abstraction’.
I’ve heard about…(a flat, fat,
growing urban experiment),
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The notion of ‘metamodel’ was used by Guattari to defy the assumption that models
are closed and pre-determined formal systems, simulation-based patterns of
recognition, or cultural, aesthetic and political schemas governing society.10 A
model is usually considered to be a formal structure, a blueprint or a set of
instructions that need to be concretely realized in order to unfold their full potential.
As opposed to this idea, a metamodel is not a blueprint. Instead, the philosopher
searched for diagrammatic relations that could challenge the closed hierarchy
between models and facts, between the formal and the practical. Whilst rejecting
the notion of model qua representation or of prototype to be applied to reality,
Guattari’s notion of metamodel fully embraces the reality of form and abstraction,
and suggests that thought is as real as any other thing.
I’ve heard about…(a flat, fat,
growing urban experiment),
R&Sie(n)
The main example used by Guattari to clarify his concept of the metamodel draws
from the virtual particles of contemporary theoretical physics, i.e. abstract entities
that can only be theoretically thought and discovered through mathematics, rather
than through empirical experimentation. Not being directly detectable in the actual
world, the metamodelling of particle physics goes beyond already determined
probabilities and describes how the abstract processing of rules “constructs its own
cartographies, its own reference points, and thus its own analytic approach, its own
analytic methodology,” at the same time incessantly re-singularizing its own
configurations.11 In this sense, it becomes clear how the notion of metamodelling
was not developed to define a schema apt to social implementation. At the same
time however, it may also be reductive to suggest that metamodelling always
already results from physical systems, whereby the model emerges from practice.
A metamodel, in fact, is a thought diagram whose signs and symbols show a
propensity to prehend an abstract, ‘alien’ world. This means that modes of
abstraction are not simply representations of reality, but are processual forms
imbued with their own reality. For this reason, metamodels enjoy a form of
temporality subtracted from linear causality and can enter infinite, indeterminate
modes of arranging data. It is this very infinity of mathematical possibilities that
constitutes their aesthetic potential. Describing the project I’ve heard about… as an
example of metamodelling will thus help us to define the software programs used in
digital architecture as soft modes of thought, numerical speculations whose
aesthetic side relies not on their visual, perceptible interface but primarily on the
abstractness of their conceptual algorithmic processing (or prehension) of data.
It is crucial to remember that Guattari’s concept of metamodelling challenges the
priority of the empirical, by revealing how the code of mathematical signs has no
physical objects as its referents, but constructs a reality that exceeds what is
physically experienceable. In the same way, computer algorithms not only describe
the use of mathematical models to compute bio-physical realities, but more
importantly announce the speculative power of soft thought, with metamodelling
ready to design spaces that are not yet and may never be lived. These algorithms
re-introduce the reality of architectures of abstraction, of virtual architectures
irreducible to the reality of the actual, a metamodelling of computational experiments
that imply a metamorphosis of abstraction, of thought and reason in themselves.
Here, software speculations are not simply models to be applied to physical
constructions, but first of all they are aesthetic adventures of ideas, of mathematical
eternal objects that can indeed follow (and transform) bio-physical structures, but
without being engendered by them. In I’ve heard about…., this algorithmic
architecture is but another instance of soft thought leading to new formalizations of
spatio-temporal actualities.
From this standpoint, I’ve heard about… is not a Platonic blueprint of a city ready to
be implemented, executed or actualized. Understood as a metamodel, I’ve heard
about… shows that the logic of algorithmic instructions is not the mere static
embodiment of an instrumental rationality, but becomes dynamic as numbers
automatically prehend themselves and the ideal, algorithmic city grows, extends and
contracts beyond its initial conditions. The algorithms of this city are therefore not
primary instructions but are continuously re-programmed through their own coral-
like growth, whose perceivable shape is constituted by recycled, synthesized and
polymerized materials. Rather than being conceivable as performative actants, or
action-instructions, these growing algorithms do not just represent or simulate but
make a city in themselves.
It should at this point be mentioned that the algorithms of I’ve heard about… have
been designed to get access to and quantify a series of data, such as: 1. the
external data of pre-existing urban morphology: structural limits, natural light, the
dimension of habitable cells; 2. the internal data of the structure and of chemical
elements: e.g. physiological empathy, endocrinal secretions, bodily emissions of the
inhabitants; 3. the electronic processing of information and decision making. All
these data are then constructed into growth scripts and neighborhood protocols.
These (biotopes) 2.0 (as R&Sie(n) calls the protocols) therefore include the
contingency of physical data within their algorithmic design. Conceptual
prehensions, as Whitehead points out, are always accompanied by parallel physical
prehensions. It is the perishing of physical data that drives algorithms to build
multiple, heterogeneous and contradictory scenarios. In this sense, the relation with
physical data structures makes finite algorithms become contingent, rather than
infinitely regenerating, because it subjects them to the constraints of physical,
chemical and electronic conditions. In other words, the architecture is programmed
to be affected by the entropic deterioration and dissipation of material data.
It is therefore true to say that the performative and temporal qualities of algorithms
are inevitably related to material data structures. On the other hand, however, the
open relation between algorithms and data cannot be exclusively explained by this
performative operability, as if algorithms were primarily ‘doers’ or actants. Of course
algorithms are temporal engines for action and implementation but, we want to
argue, this is only one side of the coin. On the other side, the reason why algorithms
continue to animate software culture is because they are and remain not only
activators and executors of physical realities, or models of the temporal evolution of
these realities, but also because they are ideal, conceptual elaborations of pure
potentials. What we propose here is, in other words, to consider algorithms as
having not only a physical but also an abstract pole. It is important to warn readers
that this ‘extra’, ideal layer of computation is not to be intended as a supracognitive,
transcendent order or just another face of idealism rooted in human thought. To the
contrary, what we mean by ‘pure potentials’ is that the formal logic of algorithms is
always inherently incomplete and infected with uncertainties. In other words, this
logic does not need to be extrinsically disrupted (as is the case with ‘glitch art’ or
with the ingression of physical contingency in algorithmic structures), but is
inherently exposed to that intrinsic incompleteness which it tries to order and
organize. If data are understandable as indeterminate quantities, it is not simply
because of the arbitrary appearance of contingencies and errors. A simple gesture
of the external intervention of chance into a formalism could never suffice to explain
how soft thought can become an instance of something that thinks, of something
that shows the unpredictable indeterminateness of thought, and that is not merely
reducible to the thought thing.12
The metamodel in I’ve heard about… points to a mathematical mode of thought
proper to machines. The urban space is in fact actually constructed by a secretion
machine or VIAB (standing for ‘viability’) made of nanoreceptacles, psychochemical
receptors of data secreted by human and nonhuman inhabitants, and of mutating
algorithms. The very processing of the material deploys the machine as a thought-
thing coinciding neither with a subject thinking nor with a thought object. The VIAB is
not a subject that enacts thought in order to make sense of the world. It is instead an
instance of thinking procedures that are machines in themselves. As Whitehead
says (with specific reference to algebraic symbols), it is not human subjects that
think through symbols, but the symbolic operations of algebra do the thinking for
us.13n some ways, these symbols are different to those of ordinary language,
because the manipulation of the algebraical symbols does your reasoning for you,
provided that you keep to the algebraic rules.” See “Alfred N. Whitehead.
Symbolism. Its Meaning and Effect. Barbour-Page Lectures, University of Virginia,
1927,” URL http://www.anthonyflood.com/whiteheadsymbolism.htm/] In the same
way, the VIAB machine does not simply execute a task, but entertains its own
algorithmic processing and in doing so it overcomes the centrality of thought as
based in thinking things.14 Things (or machines) do not think but ‘are’ thought. They
do not simply host thought or become implementations of a predeterminate
cognitive structure. Rather, thought results from the modalities or the mannerism of
the machine: what thought becomes is how the machine thinks.
 
From this standpoint, the VIAB machine cannot be said to be part of the environment
of what Andy Clark calls an ‘extended cognition’. This machine does not
complement human thought and is not simply driven by universal codes running on
any body. The machine is its own thought, without having a supplementary
dimension that grounds its cognitive structure. From this standpoint, the thinking
machine is not another instance of functionalism as it does not simply host a code
that instructs it to work in a certain way. In the core of the VIAB, fuzzy algorithms are
prehended by an insect-like robot, a pneumatic articulated machine (robotic muscle
system) knitting space whilst registering the rules of algorithmic change and
prehending biochemical data. By sieving and weaving, the machine creates a
vertical structure, a three-string bunch (each 5 cm in diameter) wrapped around on
itself, and uses a hybrid material (bio-cement) that agglutinates and coagulates
chemically. The tank loads the file describing the 3D morphology, and with its
terminal devices works like a 3D printer. This is not a swarm intelligence protocol,
but rather a ‘swarmoid’, a protocol for a division of labor that is at once centralized
and distributed, axiomatic and incomplete. In other words, this protocol’s axiomatic
is challenged by its execution and at the same time each execution cannot simply
perform the code but rather needs to transform it.
This is how the VIAB deploys another mode of thought, which is aesthetic before
being functional. It is aesthetic because, above all, it deploys a mode of feeling data,
a physical and a mental mode of elaborating on the information retrieved from the
program and the environment. As opposed to exclusively considering machine
thought as an expression of a code that can run on it, machine thinking for us has
also to account for the conceptual feeling that the VIAB machine itself has. This
means that the algorithms operating in and through the machine will not just operate
on and through blind matter. The conceptual mode of thinking here is intrinsic to the
mode of the machine and cannot therefore be otherwise. This means that the
thought of the actual machine is not simply an execution of instructions, but has
become autonomous and develops its own algorithmic modalities, where the
sequence of instructions changes according to the way the machine orders data.
This means that the machine thinks beyond the formal level of instructions, and also
beyond the empirical data it gathers from the environment. The closest thing to a
VIAB machine perhaps is a small mud-working robot invented by Behrokh
Khoshnevis, a ‘contour crafter’ working more or less like a 3-D printer.15 Contour
crafting however is a job that termites have been doing for eons, building
skyscrapers by spitting and smoothing mud.
The VIAB is indeed a busy termite with a body full of wet cement and instructions. Its
machinic parts are data and procedures, infinite and finite sets that cannot be
synthesized into a coherent, fixed and finished whole. The actual VIAB therefore is
not a mere implementation of generative algorithms. Since the model is always of a
secondary order compared to the diagrammatic constellations of a metamodel, the
VIAB machine is yet another instance of a body able to think beyond its physical
constraints. But to understand how this machine could think beyond what it already
is, one may need to turn to Whiteheads’ notion of the ‘eternal object’. This notion
directly addresses the impalpable reality of ideas, which according to Whitehead are
prehended by each and any actual entity. In particular, the notion of ideas offered
here will also help us to distinguish this mode of machine-thought from the
framework of extended cognition, according to which thought is always already an
extension of what the mind and its subset of the operations of the brain do. In fact,
extended cognition does not succeed in making or explaining such a difference and
leaves us thinking that despite their ‘alien’ nature, machines are just another
instance of a mindware operating a hardware. Instead, we want to probe the
possibility and take seriously the challenge that Whitehead’s philosophy poses: that
actual entities (no matter how small and how inorganic) have their own physical and
mental pole. Actual entities like the VIAB machine are not set to think but rather are
their own thinking, whilst they physically and conceptually prehend things and ideas.
2. Choreographic calculations
“Synchronous Objects for One flat Thing, reproduced” is a choreographic website
created by the William Forsythe Dance Company in collaboration with the Ohio
State University’s Department of Dance and its Advanced Computing Center for the
Arts and Design (ACCAD). The main aim of the website is to visualize and re-
animate the choreographic data of the performance One Flat Thing, reproduced ‘in
new ways’. Here, the conjunction of visualization and reanimation seems to coincide
with the very process of thinking: how else, the project seems to ask, can the
movements of a dance be thought?
The online platform was realized with the aid of several mapping technologies;
various image processing, computer vision, 3D computer graphics and interactive
software were then deployed to explore the mapped data, and to systematically
formalize the components of the choreographic system. The performance ‘cueing’
system, for instance, defined by Forsythe as ‘an internal clock of aural or visual
signals given and received by the dancers to trigger and organize the dance event’,
was mapped as a score of interconnected points in 3D space. This and many other
abstract diagrams of dance information (about the cues, but also about the
alignments, the directionalities of corresponding flows, the analogous shapes of
body movements, the related timings) were translated into algorithms. On their turn,
these algorithms were used to determine results and effects in other performative
modalities (such as the modeling and milling of fabricated architectural objects by a
machine instructed to ‘follow the shape’ of a particular motion). We can thus
describe the Synchronous Objects project as another example of code aesthetics
working according to the dynamics of soft thought, i.e. a level of conceptual
prehension of numerical potentials going beyond the polarization between
algorithms as sequential arrays of codes, and the visual effects generated by them.
In this project, it is in fact possible to distinguish, along the lines of Whitehead’s
philosophy, two kinds of potentiality that invest the actual entities of the code: the
abstract ‘pure potential’ of numbers as ideas, and a ‘real potential’, the potential of
each actual occasion (or each Synchronous Object) to become the datum of
another occasion, in the actual processing of the software. Let us start with a
description of the latter.
From an empirical point of view, extensive subdivisions (quantities, measures and
their related algorithms) and perspectival relations (points and lines) constitute, in
the website, a dimension of ‘real’ potential of the actual entities (movements) that
are part of the One Flat Thing, reproduced dance. The presentational immediacy of
computer graphics illustrates each of these mapped and quantified subdivisions of
the dance as a visible slice of space-time, a ‘duration’ that is objectified (or made
into a perceivable object). Through the presentation of multiple objects, the website
not only describes a way to precisely quantify and clearly illustrate the divided
choreographic structures of the performance, but it also implies the repurposing of
this information about its concrete, physical and material possibilities in other fields.
If the actual synchronous objects atomize the performance continuum (into as many
annotated regions, quanta of visualization, threads, choreographic wholes and
parts), these atoms also exhibit a mathematical relationality which corresponds to
the automated dimension of software, and at the same time transforms them into
real movement potentials, potentials of the movement to acquire infinite visible
forms.
Adopting Nigel Thrift’s terminology, we can define this potential of algorithmic
objectification of a dance as obeying the “new calculative background that is coming
into existence” in our times, “a background that will both guide and constitute what
counts as ‘thinking’.”16 Differently from the theory of extended cognition, what Thrift
seems to suggest is that the contemporary version of thought (what ‘counts’ as
thought) is a form of mindware or the softwarization of the mind that needs to be
addressed as a form of ‘qualculation’, the latter being defined by the emerging of
repetitive patterns, a background of continuous and ubiquitous calculations that
characterizes the social and material environment today. Significantly for our
choreographic example, these calculations end up producing new perceptions of
space and time, or a new ‘sensorium’. Calculation (or ‘qualculation’), in short, is the
way in which thought results from those material habituations (the repetitive
algorithms) of matter, repetitive habits that allow all bodies to find their way or
become oriented in space-time. Instead of an extended software thought running on
material bodies, here we have a form of thought emerging from the iterative patterns
and calculations of matter itself, suggesting a productive and constructivist notion of
thought that does not describe but produces nature as it builds a constrained,
ordered, objectified world. From this point of view, the linear causality of sequential
algorithms shows that thinking is the same as tracing a grid in space-time. As
already illustrated with the example of the VIAB machine and its material processing
of data, actual occasions always include a physical dimension or ‘pole’ that is, in this
case, identifiable with the linear sequencing of space and time operated by the
choreographic software. This capacity for ordering allows for what would be defined,
in Thrift’s words, as the construction of a new spatial awareness, a possibility for the
body to re-orient itself and therefore develop new thinking modalities. It is by
materially changing this level of ‘bodily thinking’ that choreographic software thus
realizes its material ‘pole’ as an actual occasion of movement experience.
In the same way, we could say that the dance, One Flat Thing, reproduced of the
website is not to be thought as a simple reproduction, or simulation, but as a
calculated nexus of events, or what Whitehead would define as an objectified set of
data, a series of ‘units of historic fact’ (such as the points mapped in the scores), or
‘pulsations’ (0s and 1s) transmitted from occasion to occasion. The data is
calculated by weaving a relation between what has been in the past, but also what
might have been, and what might be in the future: a dance step, a graphic 3D form,
a piece of furniture… The data is always actual, and its potential is always a real
possibility, a way for the body to think of its movements and find its way, or to orient
itself in the performative space-time. Following the logic of cause and effect, the
pulsed transmission of data in a liner fashion, the counting (qualculation) from past
to present to future connotes the working of digital algorithms as habitual and
diachronic, restricted to a physical and compulsory level (the physical nature of the
program). The computer is not a mindware running on bodies, but instead operates
and thinks in the same repetitive fashion of physical, inorganic, inert matter, pointing
towards a physical conception of digital binary processing, whereby cognition as
computation involves not the syntax of data but its simple repetitive patterning.
For Thrift, as well as in “Synchronous Objects”, the flux of numerical sequences
derived from the mapping of the physical performance gives way to new qualities
and intensities. Qualculations are therefore not simple descriptions of movements in
space-time, but they also imply a construction of new qualities emerging from the
very process of quantification, such as new ways to become oriented in space-time
or to perceive the dance. But what about the novelty of the project? Is this novelty
merely definable as a real potential, i.e. as a new way to sense space-time? In
Thrift’s conception, open-endedness and the possibility of novelty are always the
results of a fine grid of calculations, as if a carefully constructed absolute space
could beget a relative space. Or as if novelties were prosthetic objects created by,
and supporting, cognition, the latter only intended here as automatic navigation. As
an example of this creation, we can look at the ubiquitous presence of tracking and
mapping systems in our world, and the becoming provisional or temporary of our
spatial coordination. From this point of view, a new ‘elasticity of synchronicity’
appears as the qualitative product, and nourishment, of our technological tools of
mapping and synchronization. It is quantification that allows for new qualities – new
sensings of space-time – to emerge. It is indeed possible, to agree with Thrift, to
define the contemporary version of thought as part of an era of qualculability. The
problem is that, in order to become really open to the ‘new’, calculations cannot be
reduced to mere extensions of material patterns, nor can they be simply accounted
for in relation to their emerging effects. For us, once again, neither the linear
causality of sequential algorithms nor the perceptual qualities generated by them
can suffice to explain the particular novelty of soft thought.
3. Eternal synchronous objects
We should at this point reiterate that the main aim of the “Synchronous Objects”
project is to ‘compress’ the performative complexity of the dance, as an intricate
composition of contrapuntal movements, into a number of discrete objects (charts,
maps, scores, and then animations, graphics, computer applications) that not only
visualize, but simultaneously transduce and re-animate the complexity of the dance
elsewhere. In this sense, the objects are meant to act as vectorial operators,
transferring the relational potential of the dance to different fields, from dance
notation to music or architecture, statistics or geography. Every object becomes, in
this sense, a ‘model’ of the dance.
Cognitivist Alva Noe was one of the collaborators of this project. According to Noe,
we are a tool-using animal. We make tools to extend our bodies, but also, in line
with the ‘extended cognition’ theory, tools to extend our minds (such as
mathematical notations for performing calculations). From this very ‘McLuhanesque’
point of view, the model is also a tool, a very functional one. The weather bureau
models a storm system in the hopes of predicting the storm’s behavior:
“Synchronous Objects” is a model of the physical dance, it is an instrument for
thinking about this complex, very difficult to understand or to clearly visualize,
choreographic structure (of cueing relationships, alignments, movement themes),
by translating it to parallel fields. In the end, if the model-tool is effective, it will help
the audience (and also the dancers and the choreographer) to obtain a clear view of
the complex whole. This assumption seems to confine “Synchronous Objects” to a
very restrictive domain: that of the model as an instrumental, explicative tool. But
there is one point where Noe’s discourse becomes more interesting: for one thing to
model another, he says, this thing must exhibit something like the complexity, or all
the possibilities, of that which it models. A map, for example, in relation to the city it
describes. This means it is always possible to get lost in our maps, or in our
models. And it also means that our models become objects of inquiry in their own
right. If “Synchronous Objects” is successful, then it is likely to command our
interest and attention in its own right. This conception resonates with Guattari’s
notion of metamodelling. Metamodels alienate us by building complexity, instead of
serving us by making it more accessible: for Guattari, as we have seen, their true
value lies exactly in their capacity to do without their material counterpart, their
factual origin or aim. More like Forsythe’s ‘objects without a body’, rather than simple
tools.
A question seems now to emerge: how can the almost infinite reproduction of the
dance as an abstract algorithmic pattern become something new, something more
than a repetitive digital model? Or, in other words, “How can the future avoid being
predetermined by the past or by the relentless chain of causes and effects? How is
it possible, in the world described for us by computer science, for anything genuinely
new to emerge?”17 In Steven Shaviro’s reading of Whitehead, the appearance of the
new takes the form of an interruption of the continuous chain between past and
future: a cut where past data are valued and particular ideas are selected in every
occasion of experience, in order to determine what the future occasion will be. It is
not so important to determine the essential nature of this cut (be it material, organic,
human, atomic). What is important is to highlight how the novelty-bringing cut
always happens as an ingression of what Whitehead defines as ‘pure’ (rather than
‘real’) potentials or eternal objects.18 Pure potentials are nothing else than virtual
ideas; and yet, with all their abstraction, they add definiteness to existing data and
relations between data (rather than simply introducing new data or relations),
functioning as principles of individuation for upcoming occasions. The cut of an idea
is therefore conceptually prehended or non-sensorially felt as the novelty of
definiteness: ‘the making-definite of something that was already existing in the
‘inherited data’ but not with that particular definition (i.e., something that was merely
a real potential)’. The list of eternal objects, ideas or pure potentials can be infinite,
including not only qualities, but also such things as patterns, or numbers (one-ness,
two-ness, three-ness, ‘the square root of minus two’, or Omega), and also metric
ideas such as counterpoint. Ideas bringing forth the definite mathematical character
of an occasion, or ways in which the occasion can be cut and re-glued from the
totality of actual preexisting data.
In the dance performance, counterpoint, for example, appears as a structural form
of dialogue, a rhythm of alternation coinciding with the pure and definite potentiality of
an eternal object. Counterpoint therefore is simply an indeterminate idea of accord
which can be realized in infinite ways and can also be conceived as a mathematical
quantification. In “Synchronous Objects”, counterpoint takes the form of various
algorithmic/choreographic objects such as, for instance, ‘alignment’ (the
synchronization of two or more dancers, differently actualisable as a spatial,
temporal, or directional accord). Conceivable as a mathematical pattern in space-
time (and simultaneously as a set of 0s and 1s), alignment is the result of an idea.
This idea (counterpoint) enters the choreographic score and transforms the mapped
set of performative data into a definite occasion with a precise individual
construction in form and timing (the Alignment Annotations object, a visual
illustration of the alignments on screen, in the form of various graphic shapes and
volumes).
We are therefore, at this point, clearly already on a different aesthetic dimension
from that of the live, concrete performance event, and it is important to bear this in
mind. The technological transposition of the dance and the quantification and
collection of data become here a way to emphasize the ordered and clear aspects
of movement (the annotation of the alignments as short instances of
synchronization between the dancers, the annotation of the cues where the cueing
system of the dance unfolds in a rapidly shifting network of relationships, the
indexing of the movement themes that serve as building blocks of the motion). In
other words, the extensive, algorithmic structure of the dance, more than its
qualitative nuances, exposes organization and order as parallel aesthetic aspects of
creation that can often go unnoticed ‘live’. The capacity to abstract the organic, or
living, sensations of movement (as different from readable understandability and its
related feelings) is certainly not the technology’s main strength, and perhaps this is
not what we should look for in its manifestations. What emerges, instead, is a
different rhythmic aspect associated with the ‘aesthetics of soft thought’: alignment,
cues, the order of the themes, as feelings (or ‘conceptual feelings’) in themselves.
What appears is the infinite divisibility of choreography into autonomous patterns
doubled by an infinite possibility of actualization by each structural object: the theme
of a dance can become a dance of graphic shapes, a 3-D object, a diagram, and
allow an abstract re-thinking of the choreography (even without the intervention of
the physicality of a body). At the same time, without transforming the choreographic
composition into a sort of Platonic realm of transcendent mathematical ideals
hylomorphically imposed on the movement material, the quantitative nature of ideas
weaves a parallel abstract dance, or a movement of soft thought.
4. The indeterminacy of soft thought
Rather then being a simple thinking-machine, R&Sie(n)’s VIAB incarnates the
machine-like nature of thinking procedures. This is why we agree with the critique of
the autopoietic model of cognition qua sense-making and, in particular, against the
autopoietic assumption that thought is always already enacted by living
organisms.19 Following the autopoietic model, Varela and Thompson used the
notion of enactivism to challenge the idea that cognition is a representation of the
external world given by pre-set symbols. Against the legacy of computationalism,
according to which cognition is reducible to a physical symbol system or a mental
process carried out by the manipulation of symbolic representations in the brain,
Varela and Thompson argued that cognition is instead embedded in the world. In
particular, cognition is “the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history
of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs.”20 By rejecting
computationalism in its cognitivist and connectionist forms, the second-order
cybernetic approach to the problem of the mind, as articulated by Varela and
Thompson, was more directly concerned with the relation between cognitive
processes and the world, including the brain, its relationship to the living body and
the environment. Varela and Thompson proposed an enactive approach to explain
that “[c]ognitive structures and processes emerge from recurrent sensorimotor
patterns of perception and action”.21 In other words, cognition is not equivalent to a
form of information processing that is able to run on any system, but emerges out of
the performing activities of being in the world. From this standpoint, enactivism
explains interaction as the effect of the environment on the brain: the environment
triggers cognition to productively respond and thus enact a world. Cognition
therefore cannot be programmed since it remains a question of affective
consciousness and experience.
Whilst Varela and Thompson’s concept of enaction described above is insufficient
to explain the kind of ‘soft thinking’ we are discussing here, we also want to highlight
that the critique of computation as a form of cognition, a critique shared by both
enactivism and extended functionalism, too quickly dismisses the capacity of
information-processing to account for contingencies (the example often mentioned
here is that of traffic controllers, where computers are unable to calculate extra and
contingent factors in urban traffic).22 For extended functionalism, the formal level of
algorithms always needs a material environment onto which to distribute and
establish a relation.23 According to Clark, this relation extends or transforms the
interior apparatus of neural architecture (human cognition), hence producing novelty
in the extended architecture of the brain.24 As Clark argues, the very activity of
bodily spatio-temporal orientation is what drives the development and evolution of
inner states of cognition: additional memory and new capacities of symbol
manipulation, new forms of communication, interaction, and digital computation.
Here, the architecture of thought is no longer internal to the human brain, but the
latter has become spatially extended onto the world. Such a global brain in Clark’s
view derives from the co-evolutive relation between brain and environment, where
the techno-extension of cognition determines what thought can do beyond-the-
skin.25 Nevertheless, as Clark maintains, for cognition to work it needs a physical
ground on which to operate. In other words, whilst enactivism argues for a mind
which is generated from the interaction between elements in the environment,
extended cognition posits the primary function of thought in terms of a minimal
Cartesianism, according to which the mind exists before the body. This is why we
find that extended functionalism is unable to radically engage with cognition in its
own code. Extended functionalism, we argue, explains the relation between mental
and physical poles merely in terms of a linear causality, whereby mental states are
triggered by and bear upon systemic inputs and outputs. Thus, whilst we agree with
its critique against the autopoietic explanation of cognition, we also find it difficult to
see how extended functionalism could seriously challenge formal structures of
cognition, or explain novel forms of thought beyond a mere pragmatics of
functionality that always already needs a material ground on which to run. If
algorithmic thought is more than the biological brain, then it has to be defined
according to its own reality, however abstract this may be. The metamodels of I’ve
heard about… and Synchronous Objects are machine-thoughts that disentangle the
power of computation from pre-programmed instructions and, perhaps
unfashionably, do not support the idea that material extensions change the internal
structures of cognition. In fact, we want to emphasise that the main limit of
computation is not its incapacity to include material contingencies. Quite the
opposite, computation, or the formal architecture of algorithms, only remains limited
to a closed formalism if one does not take into consideration how algorithms
themselves tend towards abstraction, infinity, or the reality of the incomputable.
Novelty is already internal to computation, to the extent that, as Turing already
envisaged, the limit of computation, or the infinite potential sequence of logical
symbols and interpretation is the very condition by which algorithmic finite rules can
be established. Thus, algorithms are not only actions or pragmatic functions but
also, as Deleuze may call them, suspensions of action or forms of contemplation of
this infinity.26 These suspensions correspond to the infinite discontinuities that
algorithms encounter in the processing of binary unit sequences, as these are
always prehensions or captures of the incomputable data haunting their own precise
sequencing. It could be argued that these forms of contemplation may appear as
glitches internal to the operational functions of the system. In fact, the conceptual
prehension that algorithms have of infinite quantities of data does not interrupt the
digital operation but rather allows it to happen. In other words, whilst algorithms
carry out the functions of processing, they are also conceptual prehensions of what
lies at the limit of computation: an infinite amount of random (non-compressible)
data. In this sense, algorithms are forms of contemplation, conceptual prehensions
of incomputable information. It is important to point out again that such suspensions
do not correspond to blockages but to the abstract passions of algorithmic thought,
or the way in which ideas enter actual computational occasions. These forms of
algorithmic contemplation imply the impossibility to reduce processing to mere
axiomatic formulas. Even the most reductive of axioms cannot but enter a field of
data infecting them with their alien, infinite logic, whilst deploying a sort of
xenogenesis of information within the sequential order of rules.
This conception might easily seem relatable to Deleuze’s notion of contemplation. In
fact, rather than being connected to a vortex of qualities and bodily sensations
populating the space between action and reaction (as in Deleuze’s concept), soft
thought also, and necessarily, involves a more abstract engagement with the
mathematical reality of indeterminate quantities. For this reason, we prefer to push
the notion of contemplation towards Whitehead’s emphasis on conceptual
prehensions, so as to describe how algorithmic thought is infected with
incomputable data, eternal objects which can be thought of as infinite series of
indeterminate mathematical ideas or ‘pure numerical potentials’. From this
standpoint, we suggest that these indeterminate ideas are incomputable series of
0s and 1s which enter algorithmic sets to constitute a conceptual event: ideas are
introduced in every actual construction of code through conceptual feelings, marking
the aesthetic character of software thought. This means that the computational limit
does not simply reveal the failure of quantifications, divisions, partitions in attending
novelty. On the contrary, this failure is mainly a symptom of the real presence of
random quantities, which cannot be reduced to what is always already axiomatized.
This is why the philosophical question posed to the digital finds its true counterpart
in aesthetics, or in the limit of the binary code as the point at which the infinity of data
is revealed.
Bringing speculation into computer science, Omega, a discrete infinity of real
numbers, as Gregory Chaitin defines it, explains how uncompressible quantities
enter the sequential order of 0s and 1s at the limit of computation.27 In the same
way, in R&Sie(n)’s I’ve heard about it, the use of protocols of incertitude (i.e.,
protocols that include incompletion and indetermination in their structure) and the re-
scripting of source codes creates an aesthetics driven by the algorithmic
prehensions of indeterminate quantities. Here, software becomes infected by
algorithmic aesthetics, and the automated process establishes a relation with its
limit, remaining abducted by the indeterminate quantities that it implies but cannot
compress. If, on the one hand, the contemporary city is usually still formatted under
Windows-cogito, foreclosing access to the programming of source codes, the use
of open-source software scripts in I’ve heard about… invites incompleteness in the
axiomatics of urban planning. This is why R&Sie(n)’s meta-model project is not a
model of a city, but places indeterminate quantities of data at the core of the source
code of the city itself.28 To open the source code is to unlock cogito from functional
cognition and to reveal an aesthetics of soft thought, whereby software operations
are also, and significantly for us, conceptual prehensions of pure potentialities,
eternal objects or infinite ideas passing through thousands of thinking entities. At the
same time, the indeterminacy and incompleteness of the code is not principally
given by the fact that R&Sie(n) use open software to design this urban structure.
More important for us is that the protocols have been designed as incomplete forms
of instructions that do not simply face physical variables and contingencies, but,
above all, the more abstract architecture of an algorithmic infinity. In this sense, the
source code is not just shared, but is open towards the very limits of computation,
where data architectures have become hosts of an incomputable amount of junk
data. Here the limit of computation is rather an opportunity for posing the existence
of an automated thought thinking beyond its axiomatic form. The incomputable
quantity of junk data indeed refers to data without pattern, chaotic and random,
pressing against the sequential function of computation. In other words, openness is
intrinsic to the calculation of ideas.
In the same way, for its interdisciplinary openness, the “Synchronous Objects”
website could be described as an example of ‘open source’ choreography, a
creative resource to explore space, movement, and the movement-space
composition through the constant interrelation between parallel fields and
disciplines: the website itself appears, in other words, as a ‘generative tool’.29 The
resonance of this definition with Forsythe’s own choreographic technique, and
particularly with the creative methodological and conceptual aims of the
“Synchronous Objects” website, seems obvious: to use choreographic data and
dance ideas as initial models to ‘catalyze new creativity’ and generate ‘a myriad of
other manifestations of structure’. At the same time, it is important to remember
how it is the ingression of quantitative and yet indeterminate ideas such as
counterpoint in the choreographic process of “Synchronous Objects for One flat
thing, reproduced”, that determines the aesthetics of soft thought. Being a pure
indeterminate, such as Omega itself, counterpoint is certainly not determined by a
preexisting level of precise human decision-making or automatic algorithmic
functioning. It is only is already realized form as a precise and particular alignment,
that responds to these. On the other hand, it is certainly not a Platonic conception of
inspiration, an intellectualization of practice, that we are suggesting here. To the
contrary, what we are arguing is that it is the very capacity of software as first of all a
prehension of abstract mathematical ideas to be not only ubiquitous but also able to
articulate different spatio-temporal configurations in a bodily movement or a whole
city.
5. A germ of conclusion: towards the capitalization of soft thought
We will now conclude this article by reiterating that the aesthetics of soft thought
does not necessarily have to pass through the dysfunctionality of the glitch and its
generative effects, or through the affective interaction between body and technology.
It has been extensively argued, in many accounts of digital art, as well as in the
architectural and choreographic envisioning of algorithmic relations, that the
quantitative nature of digital code can indeed unleash signs of aliveness, but only
thanks to the capacity of perception to transform a series of bits into a folding of
qualities and sensations (the intensity of a dance, the texturality and habitability of a
building). Contrary to this approach, the aim of this article has been to argue that,
rather than having to follow the causality of sensorial and perceptual effects,
complex algorithmic or quantitative ideas, such as the binary infinity of Omega
implicit in every computational process, or the indeterminate rhythmicity of
counterpoint present in every choreographic process, already imply an aesthetics of
soft thought. These indeterminate mathematical ideas constitute in fact a level of
conceptual feelings, or prehensions, through which algorithms open themselves to
the openness and randomness of thought.
At this point, we would like to highlight here a possible germ for future thought, by
stressing how soft thought does not simply point towards creative openness, but
also involves a new aesthetics of power which capitalizes on the capacities of rules
and variables to prehend new ideas. As recent debates on pre-emptive power have
suggested, cognitive capitalism does not simply operate on the realm of
possibilities, but forecloses the realm of potentialities to packaged possibilities,
whilst capitalizing on thinking processes themselves.30 As much as automated
thoughts have the power to transform data into a meta-software (where all
processing is possible), such as for with instance Lev Manovich’s idea of media as
a subset of software,31 the ingression of indeterminate potentials in calculating
procedures has turned pre-emptive power into a metamodel for the speculative
programming of novelties. A power, in other words, exercised through the aesthetics
of soft thought.
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